
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WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP WASHINGTON, D C 20305

2 2 DEC 1966

5:50/5/

Honorable Richard Helms 2430 E Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to ascertain more precisely what the U.S. national political and military authorities will need to know about crucial military events on the battlefield in order to be adequately prepared for critical decisions and to assess our present capability to support such requirements.

As part of its investigation, WSEG was directed to initiate a series of personal interviews with political and military leaders who have had senior responsibilities at the national and theater levels. The results will be reported only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and the findings will be generalized and published on a classified basis, without personal attribution.

To be responsive to the requirements of the JCS, WSEG must complete its program of interviews by about 25 January 1967. Our present schedule calls for interviews in Europe during the period 5 to 14 January 1967.

Due to the press of time I have asked Dr. Arnold who is the project leader to contact you or your office by telephone with a view toward arranging an interview. I hope you will be able to fit this into your busy schedule.

Sincerely,

K.S. MASTERSON Vice Admiral, USN

Director

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

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27 DECEMBER 1966 -- Telephone Conversation

1:45 -- DDCI called Adm. Masterson of WSEG; he was out, so spoke with Dr. Arnold

DDCI said he was curious to know more of the background relative to Adm. Masterson's letter of 22 Dec. requesting that Mr. Helms grant an interview to Dr. Arnold regarding a project on capability to support requirement of national and political and military authorities in crises situations.

Arnold said that Mr. Vance has asked the Joint Chiefs to look into the general problem of trying to make tactical situation reporting in combat theaters more responsive to needs and to look at the question of how adequately national authorities would be informed if confronted on the battlefield. Part of this effort has been farmed out to WSEG and, in attempting to pin down a place to start, WSEG decided to talk to experienced senior people in terms of their experiences in crises in general and essentially what they would be after would be to try to pin down the degree, reasons and nature or demands for specific information of a tactical nature at the national decision-making level. This has two dimensions -- looking at our own people, and simultaneously having the same type of question as to what the other fellow is doing. "We would like to talk with experienced people who have been experienced in national crises to pin point the demands."

DDCI asked, "The environment you are talking about - time and events any time from now on or situations in which a crisis builds up, as well as what happens when we come into conflict?"

Arnold said yes. Said there are two perspectives -- ultimate object is to look at requirements and then figure systems. Spectrum from when an incident occurs; what you need to know to alert you to look at it at the national level; and then, once focusing on terms, what it may signify and what in terms of national decisions would they want to know, for the national policy makers who are trying to define national policy boundaries. He said they would be talking to the White House, State, DIA and such others in the decision making community.

DDCI said, what you're after is what we need to know in order to do our part in these things. Arnold agreed. DDCI said he would talk to DCI about this.

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On 27 December Admiral Raborn requested a get together with some veterans of last year's Dominican crisis. His purpose was to prepare himself for a session with the Pentagon's Weapon System Evaluation Group (WSEG). WSEG is trying to analyze how "battle-field information" - read tactical intelligence - can be better fed into the national decision making process.

R. J. Smith chaired a roundtable with Admiral Raborn on 28 December at which John Bross,

were in attendance. The discussion rambled over a great deal of past history - much of it to refresh the Admiral's memory on events and procedures.

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It is difficult to say what tack the Admiral decided to take before WSEG. He seemed most impressed with exploring means to alleviate "paper suffocation" during crisis periods. He proposed to tell WSEG that the task force approach works well and to propose that the White House Situation Room be turned into a national ops center during crises. On the latter point he agreed that the Agency should be the logical body to supply competent staffing and to provide analytic judgments on the significance of incoming intelligence from all sources.

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3 January 1967

DDCI talked to Dr. Arnold on phone about this request. Steno notes attached.

Admiral Raborn is also on the list for interview by WSEG. Please see memo (also attached) relating action taken.

Adm. Masterson: Code 11-76335

Dr. Arnold: Code 11-52535

Approved TO: DDCI

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

20 DEC 1966

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to I-17367/66

Honorable Richard Helms Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr Helms: Wick:

There has been in recent months a series of events, statements and commentaries which indicate a growing interest in the possibility of new security arrangements in Europe.

I would appreciate it if one or more estimates or studies could be produced on: (a) current and projected attitudes and expectations of Western and Eastern European countries (including USSR) towards the proposed European Security Conference, and (b) the nature of proposals for European security arrangements likely to be advanced by France, USSR or other European countries, and known or probable reactions thereto.

Since it is likely that there will be additional proposals and developments on this subject, I anticipate that estimates or reports, as above, may prove to be desirable on a periodic basis.

Sincer

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